Preprocess messy CTF input files before they reach the model or agentic harness. Use for many files in different formats, hidden text, encoded blobs, metadata, comments, scripts, archives, OCR/transcript output, or suspected prompt-injection and anti-AI tripwires such as ignore previous instructions, do not use AI, AI is prohibited, fake tool calls, exfiltration orders, or refusal bait. It inventories inputs, extracts them safely, quarantines hostile spans, preserves originals, and emits sanitized copies plus a manifest for model use. Pairs with ctf-ai-ml and ctf-forensics.
cp -r cryptoskill/skills/dev-tools/abhay2008-ctf-input-sanitize .claude/skills/clawhub install abhay2008-ctf-input-sanitizeCapabilities below are detected automatically by an open-source scanner that reads the skill's text and scripts (see how this is computed). Not measured means the scanner couldn't make a confident call — it is NOT a green check, and you should treat it as a possible red flag until a human or a stronger scanner has measured it.
router_orchestrator Phase 1 single-mode classification — multi-mode breakdown deferred to Phase 2.
We did not find any well-known hosted services in this skill's text or scripts. This does NOT mean the skill is local-only — it might use services we don't yet recognize, or talk to them through code paths our scanner can't reach. A complete dependency list (every package, library, and binary, with integrity hashes) is on the roadmap; today we only show recognized hosts.
No one has audited this skill yet. That is different from “audited and clean” — it just means no professional reviewer (a security firm, the CryptoSkill team, or a verified independent researcher) has signed off on it. There are no audit reports to read. How reviewer levels work →
SKILL.md → SOURCE.md → TRUST.auto.yaml → Browse directory →
Auto-generated by cryptoskill/extract-capabilities/0.3.1 · hosted-service list version 2026-09-06 · how this is computed